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WHAT'S MY SHARE? TWO PROBLEMS OF
DISTRIBUTION OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES
IN OKLAHOMA INTESTATE SUCCESSION
MARGARET H. PoTTs*

When a person dies without a will, disposition of his property is
determined by state statutes on intestate succession. Distribution of an
intestate estate in Oklahoma is controlled by Chapter 4 of Title 84 of
the Oklahoma Statutes.' If distribution were always to only one person, life would be simpler. Section 213 of Title 84 provides, however,
for distribution of an intestate estate among a surviving spouse and
numerous blood relatives of a decedent. 2 This section determines the
order of preference among the spouse and designated blood relatives
and describes the method for determining the fractional share of the
decedent's property that each participant is to receive. 3 Among blood
relatives, several classes of takers are identified, each class to participate only if there is no surviving member of any of the more preferred
4
classes.

Recently the Oklahoma legislature has taken steps to modernize
and to clarify those Oklahoma statutes controlling procedure for
handling both testate and intestate estates. 5 An area overlooked in this
@1981 Margaret Holmes Potts
*B.A.; J.D., College of William and Mary; LL.M., Temple. Assistant Professor,
University of Tulsa College of Law.-Ed.
1 84 OKLA. STAT. §§ 211-61 (1971 & Supp. 1979).
2 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 (1971).
The spouse is to receive one-half of the estate if (1) decedent leaves one child or issue
of one child or (2) decedent leaves no issue but leaves at least one surviving parent or sibling and
none of the estate consists of property "acquired by the joint industry of husband and wife during coverture." 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 First, Second (1971). If decedent leaves two or more
children or issue of deceased children, the spouse takes one-third of the estate unless the decedent was married more than once, in which case the spouse takes one-third of the property acquired during coverture and shares equally with the children of decedent in all property not acquired during coverture. Id. § 213 First. The surviving spouse takes all property acquired by
joint industry during coverture when decedent leaves no surviving issue, id. § 213 Second, and
the whole estate when decedent leaves no surviving issue, parent or sibling, id. § Fifth. For
discussion of coverture property and intestacy, see Lilly, Oklahoma's Troublesome Coverture
Property Concept, 11 TuL. L.J. 1 (1975).
The classes designated in section .213, in order of preference, are: children and issue of
deceased children (descendants), parents, brothers and sisters (siblings) and children of deceased
brothers and sisters, and next of kin. 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 (1971). The chart, "Intestate Succession in Oklahoma," sets out the general scheme of distribution established by section 213, with
the methods of apportionment applicable in various situations.

16

OKLA. STAT. § 901 (Supp. 1979); 58 OKLA. STAT.

§§ 241, 331, 382,
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admirable project is the need for amendment of the substantive statute
controlling intestate succession. The current procedural reforms are
designed to make the administration of decedents' estates clear, fair,
simple, and consistent. These goals cannot be achieved fully if linguistic ambiguities and inconsistencies of philosophy are retained in the
substantive scheme of intestate distribution.
There are two particularly glaring problems existing in the basic
scheme of intestate distribution set out in section 213. This article
discusses these problems and suggests appropriate amendments for
their resolution. 6 To reinforce the philosophy of the procedural
changes, section 213 must be amended to clarify the method of determining shares of multi-generational descendants 7 and to resolve a blatent inconsistency in the treatment of nieces and nephews of an intestate decedent.'
Part I of this article deals with an ambiguity in the language of
section 213 First, which controls distribution to lineal heirs of a decedent.9 When a decedent leaves as heirs grandchildren and children of
deceased grandchildren, it is not clear whether the grandchildren take'
equal shares'" or shares based on the portions their parents would have
taken had they survived the decedent." The solution most compatible
with the philosophy and scheme of section 213 is distribution to grandchildren in equal shares as the primary objects of the decedent's affection and bounty. Although the question has never been decided by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, it is likely that a different and less equitable interpretation is applied today in Oklahoma. The absence of a
decision on the question may be the result of an assumption among
Oklahoma lawyers and probate judges that the less equitable rule ap391.1, 391.2, 412, 421, 423, 426, 673, and 676 (Supp. 1979); 58 OKLA. STAT. §§ 11, 240, 677, 859
[new], 281, 331, 391.1 [amendments] (Supp. 1980).
6 An alternative to the changes suggested in this article might be to adopt the Uniform
Probate Code provisions regarding intestate succession. The changes suggested here are
necessary because there seems to be no willingness to adopt the Uniform Code in Oklahoma at

present.
See text accompanying notes 49-61 infra.
See text accompanying notes 86-106 infra.
9 The applicable portion of section 213 states: "but if there be no child of the decedent
living at his death, the remainder goes to all of his lineal descendants; and if all the descendants
are in the same degree of kindred to the decedent they share equally, otherwise they take according to the right of representation." 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 First (1971).
20 Per capita, or "by heads," "simply means that whoever takes per capita, either under
a will or under the statutes of descent and distribution, share equally." White, Per Stirpes or Per
Capita, 13 U. CN. L. Rav. 298 (1939). "When [children or other relatives] take per capita they
take directly in their own right and not because they represent any one else." Id.
" "Taking per stirpes means taking by representation. When children, or other relatives,
take per stirpes, they take because they represent their parents, or other ancestors." Id.
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plies because it is the rule applicable to a similar California statute,
upon which the Oklahoma statute was based. Were an appropriate
case to reach the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the California interpretation could easily be rejected on the basis of differences between the
California and Oklahoma statutes and inconsistency between the philosophy of the California interpretation and that of the scheme of succession in Oklahoma. A better solution, however, is for the legislature
to amend section 213 to provide clearly for equal distribution among
surviving grandchildren whenever all of decedent's children predeceased him without regard to whether some predeceased grandchild of
decedent left surviving children.
Part II of this article considers an inconsistency in the treatment
of nieces and nephews under section 213. If a decedent leaves a surviving spouse, her nieces and nephews will share in her estate if at least
one brother or sister of the decedent survives.I 2 If no brother or sister
survives the decedent, nieces and nephews are excluded entirely from
participation in the estate." This result is inconsistent with the whole
pattern of intestate succession set up by section 213. If nieces and
nephews are considered to be sufficiently close relations to a decedent
to share in the estate when a decedent leaves a surviving spouse, they
should share without regard to whether a sibling of the decedent other
than their parent survives. Section 213 should be amended to resolve
the inconsistency in its treatment of nieces and nephews.
I.

Dividing Up Grandmother'sEstate: Apportionment Among
Descendants of Deceased Children of an Intestate

Grandchildren and more remote descendants of a decedent are
eligible to participate in a decedent's estate by virtue of their blood
relationship to decedent's children. The language used in the statute to
14
identify them as heirs is "issue of deceased children.'
Section 213 sets out the method of computing the shares to be
taken by individual members of each identified class of heirs. The
statute uses the phrases "in equal shares," "equally," or "by right of
representation" to designate how a portion is to be divided within a
class. The identification of issue of deceased children as heirs is consistently accompanied by the command that they take "by right of
representation."

22

84 Oio.A. STAT. § 213 Second (1971).

1184

OiaA.

STAT. § 213 Fifth (1971); Hughes v. Bell, 55 Okla. 555, 155 P. 604 (1916).

1484 OLA. STAT.

§ 213 First (1971).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol34/iss2/4

19811

DISTRIBUTION OF DECEDENTS' ESTA TES

271

The phrase "by right of representation"" is defined in section
228: "inheritance or succession by right of representation takes place
when the descendants of any deceased heir take the same share or right
in the estate of another person that their parents would have taken if
living.' 6 Unfortunately, this definition is inadequate for resolving
certain problems that may arise in applying the provisions of section
213 to distribute an intestate estate among descendants of decedent.
To illustrate the problem, assume that Martha dies leaving no spouse
and no children surviving. Her only surviving descendants are a grandchild and three great-granchildren. Two of the great-grandchildren are
the children of Martha's deceased grandchild, Joseph; one is the child
of a second deceased grandchild, Martin. The family relationships are
set forth in the following chart:
Martha(d)

I

I
Johnd)

ary(d)

__
Joscph(d)

I________

Jacob

I

Judith

I________

Janice

CHILDREN

I
Martin(d)

I

Mildred

GRANDCHILDREN

GREATGRACL
GRANDHILDREN

Section 213 First provides that the whole estate is to go to the issue of
the decedent if decedent leaves no surviving spouse but does leave
issue.' 7 There is no explicit statement as to how the estate is to be
distributed among descendants should no child of decedent survive
her, but it is reasonable to assume that the parallel provision for
distribution among descendants where decedent left a surviving spouse
should guide distribution where there is no surviving spouse. 8 Where a
" The phrase "by right of representation" appears nine times in section 213. It is used
four times in § 213 First with reference to descendants of the decedent, twice in § 213 Second,
and once in § 213 Third with reference to children of deceased brothers and sisters of the decedent. It is used once in § 213 Seventh and once in § 213 Eighth with reference to the children of a
deceased parent of decedent from whom decedent has inherited property. Subdivisions Seventh
and Eighth control the situation in which decedent is a minor child who first inherits property
from a parent and then dies before reaching the age of majority or marrying.
16 84 OKLA. STAT. § 228 (1971).
" 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 First (1971).
18Id.
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spouse survives, the two-thirds share to be taken by decedent's

"children, and... issue of any deceased child... goes to all of [decedent's] lineal descendants; and if all the descendants are in the same
degree of kindred to the decedent they share equally, otherwise they
take by right of representation."' 9
In the illustration, Martha's heirs are clearly Judith (grandchild),
Jacob, Jarice, and Mildred (great-grandchildren). These heirs are not

of the same degree of kinship to the decedent, Martha. 0 The command of the statute that "otherwise, they take according to the
right of re-presentation" dearly is applicable.
It is iot clear, however, how that clause is to be applied in this
case. Two very different answers have been given by courts called
upon to construe that exact phrase in their own statutes of descent and
distribution.21 Under one view, the "root ' 22 generation is the generation nearest to the common ancestor, regardless of whether there is a
surviving representative of that generation.23 Thus, in the example, the
estate would be divided into two major portions, one-half to be divided among the descendants of each represented child of decedent. Mildred would take one-half the estate as sole representative of her grand19Id.
20 The method of determining degrees of kinship in Oklahoma is controlled by statute.
84 OKLA. STAT. §§ 217-221 (1971). Section 220 provides: "In the direct line there are as many
degrees as there are generations. Thus the son is, with regard to the father, in the first degree;
the grandson in the second; and vice versa with regard to the father and grandfather toward the
sons and grandsons." Judith is in the second degree of kinship to Martha; Jacob, Janice, and
Mildred are third degree kin. For discussion of alternative methods of determining kinship, see
ATKINSON, WLLs 45-49 (2d ed. 1953).

21 See notes 23 and 24, infra. There is a third method of distributing an estate among
kindred of varying degrees but the language of the Oklahoma statute precludes its use. See
Estate of Poindexter, 221 N.C. 246, 20 S.E.2d 49 (1942). Under this method, an initial division
is made based on the generation nearest to the decedent that has a living representative. The
estate is divided into as many shares are there are members of that generation living or having
living issue. Each living member of the nearest generation receives one of these shares. The reraaining shares are added together and their sum is divided equally among all the participating
members of the next generation of descendants. If three generations are represented, the division
at the second generation is based on the number of members living or deceased leaving issue.
Again, shares of the deceased members of this generation are combined and divided equally
among the members of the next (third) generation. For further discussion of this method of
distribution, see Waggoner, A ProposedAlternative to the Uniform ProbateCode's System for
Intestate DistributionAmong Descendants, 66 Nw. U.L. Rv.626 (1971); Comment, UNIFORM

PROBATE CODE § 2-103.

22 Source, or stock. The root generation is the generation at which the initial division of
an estate is to be made in distributing that estate in representative shares.
2" See Maud v. Catherwood, 67 Cal. App. 2d 636, 155 P.2d 111 (1945), discussed in text
accompanying notes 26 to 34, infra. For a survey of the application of per stirpes distribution in
England and America, see White, supra note 6. White concludes that the Maud application is
against the weight of authority in American jurisdictions. Id. at 352-53.
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mother, Mary. Judith would take one-fourth as representative of onehalf of the share of her father, John. Jacob and Janice would each
take one-eighth, sharing equally as representatives of one-half of the
share of their grandfather, John.
Under the opposing view, the "root" generation is the generation
nearest to decedent in which there is a surviving member.2 Under this
approach, the estate would be divided into three major portions, based
on the number of Martha's grandchildrenliving or represented. Judith
would take a one-third share as grandchild of Martha; Mildred would
take a one-third share as sole representative of her father, Martin; and
Jacob and Janice each would take a one-sixth share 25 as representatives of their father, Joseph.
Californiaand Massachusetts: Conflicting Views
In 1945, the California Court of Appeals adopted the first of
these two methods of computing shares to be taken by descendants. In
2 6 the California court was asked to interpret
Maud v. Catherwood,
California Probate Code Section 222,27 which is identical to Oklahoma's Title 84, Section 213 First. The question was the application of
California succession statutes to distribution of a trust corpus among
the settlor's grandchildren and children of the settlor's deceased
grandchildren. The settlor, Judge S. Clinton Hastings, had provided
for dissolution of the trust upon the death of the last beneficiary of the
trust. The beneficiaries were the settlor, his wife, and his seven
children. Upon dissolution of the trust, the corpus was to be distributed to "the then living lineal descendants of [S. Clinton Hastings] in
fee, each of said descendants taking such parts or portions as they
would have been entitled to as heirs at law of [S. Clinton Hastings]
had he himself been the last survivor of the said beneficiaries last
above enumerated." 2 Thus the corpus was to be distributed according
to the provisions of California Probate Code Section 222.29 The
California court decided that the clause-"if all of the descendants are
in the same degree of kindred to the decedent they share equally,
otherwise they take by right of representation"-required that division
of the corpus begin with the generation of Judge Hastings' children. In
a strict grammatical sense, the only antecedent available for the pro2 See Balch v. Stone, 149 Mass. 39, 20 N.E. 322 (1889), discussed in text accompanying
notes 35 to 44, infra.
25One-half of a one-third share.
25 67 Cal. App. 2d 636, 155 P.2d Ill (1945).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 222 (West 1956).
"
, 67 Cal. App. 2d 636, 638, 155 P.2d 111, 112 (1945).
' CAL. PROB. CODE § 222 (West 1956).
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noun "they" in the last phrase of the clause is "all of the
descendants.''10 Therefore, the Maud court reasoned that the statute
must intend that each and every descendant take by representation
whenever there are heirs in different degrees of kinship to the decedent. 1
The court's interpretation was reinforced by the definition of
"representation" found in California Probate Code Section 250: "Inheritance or succession 'by right of representation' takes place when
the descendants of a deceased person take the same share or right to
the estate of another that such deceased person would have taken as
an heir ifliving."' 32 The status of grandchildren and more remote
lineal descendants of a decedent as heirs is based on their relationship
to the children of the decedent. They are identified in the statutes by
the terms "'lineal descendants" or "issue of deceased children," not
individually as "grandchildren" or "great-grandchildren." The
California court concluded that the "deceased person" referred to in
section 250 was the child of a decedent.3 Combination of the definition of "right of representation" with the language of section 222
yielded the following: "the descendants of a deceased [child of a decedent] should take the same right or share in the estate of [decedent] as
[that child] would have taken if living." 3
A different result was reached in Massachusetts in Balch v.
Stone,3 5 which was decided in 1889. The Massachusetts statute contained language identical to that in the California statute in designating how distribution was to be made among lineal heirs in different
degrees of kinship to the decedent. 6 However, the Massachusetts
definition of "taking by representation" was different from the
California definition. Massachusetts Public Statutes, Chapter 125,
Section 6, provided: "inheritance or succession by right of representation shall be deemed to take place when the descendants of a deceased
heir take the same share or right in the estate of another person that
their parenis would have taken if living." 37 The Massachusetts court
acknowledged that a strict grammatical interpretation of the phrase
30

67 Cad. App. 2d 636, 642, 155 P.2d 111, 114 (1945).

31

Id.

CAL. PROB. CODE § 250 (West 1956) (emphasis added).
67 Cal. App. 2d 636, 645, 155 P.2d 111, 116 (1945).
34 Id.
1 149 Mass. 39, 20 N.E. 322 (1889). The Maud opinion cites Balch but rejects it as
wrongly decided without mentioning the differences in the definitions of "taking by representation" found in the two statutes. 67 Cal. App. 2d 636, 651, 155 P.2d 111 (1945).
36 149 Mass. 39, 40, 20 N.E. 322, 323 (1889).
Id. at 43, 20 N.E. at 325 (emphasis added).
32

33
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"otherwise, they take by right of representation" would compel a
holding that all heirs take by representation in any situation involving
claims by heirs of differing degrees of kin to the decedent. 8 However,
"upon consideration of the context and the history of the legislation
*.. and of the spirit which pervades it," 39 the court concluded that the
strict grammatical construction could not control "without defeating
the intention of the legislature." ' 40 After examining the history of the
Massachusetts statute and its general scheme of distribution, the Balch
court concluded that the policy of the statute was that heirs in equal
degree of kinship to decedent take equally whenever possible, with
representation being limited to those of more remote degree when
several degrees of kinship were represented. 1 "[W]e cannot . . .
believe that the legislature intended to destroy this equality among next
of kin who are living, because one who would, if living, be in equal
degree of kindred with them happened to die before the intestate, leaving children." ' 42 To reinforce this conclusion, the court turned to the
statutory definition of representation, pointing out:
Now, if... defendant be correct, that when there are descendants
or issue of unequal degree the nearest descendants or issue who are living are to take per stirpes, and not per capita, the more remote issue
would not take by representation as defined by the statute. If the estate
is divided per stirpes they would get a different
share from that which
43
their parent would have taken if living.
Thus the court concluded that the intended antecedent for the pronoun "they" in the phrase "otherwise, they take by right of represen44
tation" was "descendants in a more remote degree."
Conflict Resolved
The results in Maud and Balch differ partly because of a different
approach to analysis of the statute and partly because of the different
statutory definitions of "right of representation" in California and
Massachusetts. The California court felt bound by strict rules of grammar, while the Massachusetts court believed that grammatical niceties
should bow to consideration of legislative policy underlying the
distribution scheme as a whole. A major factor in each court's deci38

Id.

Id.

at 40, 20 N.E. at 323.
Id.
,1Id. at 42, 20 N.E. at 324.
42 Id., 20 N.E. at 324-25.
41 Id. at 43, 20 N.E. at 325.
4 Id.
3

40
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sion, however, was the applicable statutory definition of "right of
representation." This difference in definition was an important factor
in each court's decision to adopt or to reject strict grammatical construction of the distribution statute.
The statutory definition of "right of representation" has two
essential elements. The first is the identification of the situation in
which it can be applied. In both California and Massachusetts, taking
by representation can occur only "when the descendants of a deceased
heir take ' "' some share in an estate. The second element is identification of the portion to be taken by one who takes by representation.
That portion is the share "that such deceased person would have taken
as an heir if living ' ""1in California, but it is the share "that their
parents would have taken ' 47 in Massachusetts. Logically, the California version contemplates reference to the same ancestor (root) for
identifying both the person eligible to take and the portion to be
taken. The Massachusetts version allows one root to be used to identify a person as heir and another root to be used to determine the share
that person takes.
Under either definition, read with the statute providing for inheritance by "issue of deceased children," the root used to identify
heirs is clearly a child of the decedent. Under the California version,
the share to be taken by representation should be determined with
reference to the share that that root, the child, would have taken had
he survived the decedent. Thus the initial division of the property
would be made at the generation of children of decedent, as was
ordered in Maud. Great-grandchildren take under the provision for
"issue of deceased children" or "issue of decedent." If the grandchildren were allowed to take per capita and the great-grandchildren
required to take per stirpes under the California definition of representation, the result would be not only illogical but also impossible of execution. In the example of Martha's estate, given above, the shares to
be taken would be:

4"

46

"

See text accompanying notes 31 and 36, supra.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 250 (West 1956).
MAss. PuB. STAT. ch. 125, § 6, cited in Balch v. Stone, 149 Mass. 39, 20 N.E. 322

(1889).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol34/iss2/4

1981]

277

DISTRIBUTION OF DECEDENTS' ESTA TES
Martha(d)

I

I

John(d)

I

yd)

-___I___I

Judith

Jostph(d)

1

(1/3)

I

I

CHILDREN

Martin(d)

GRANDCHILDREN

GREAT-

Jacob

Janice

Mildred

(1/8)

(1/8)

(1/2)

GRANDCHILDREN

Judith, as surviving grandchild, would take a one-third share because
there are three grandchildren surviving or leaving issue surviving. The
three great-grandchildren, being required to take by representation,
would be entitled to participate in the shares that would have been
taken by their respective grandparents, children of decedent, had those
grandparents survived decedent. Because each child of decedent would
have taken one-half had he or she survived decedent, Mildred, as sole
representative of Mary's line, would be entitled to one-half the estate.
Jacob and Janice, as equal representatives of one-half of John's line,
would each be entitled to one-eighth of the estate.
Unfortunately, 1/3 plus 1/2 plus 2/8 equals 1 1/12, or more than
100 percent of the estate. The sum of the shares to be distributed must
always equal the whole. If the great-grandchildren are to take "by
right of representation" a share determined by the share that their
grandparents would have taken, the grandchildren must also take by
representation so that the sum of the shares will equal the whole.
The Massachusetts definition of "right of representation" does
not require that the share of one taking by representation be based on
the share that would have gone to the ancestor who is the root for
determining the eligibility of the taker to participate in the estate. By
its terms, the share to be taken by a descendant of a deceased child is
the share that the taker's parentwould have taken had that parent survived the decedent. Thus great-grandchildren taking by representation
should take the share that their parents, decedent's grandchildren,
would have taken had they survived decedent. Unlike the California
version, the plain wording of this definition can be applied to allow
only great-grandchildren to take by representation when no child of
decedent survives, with grandchildren taking per capita. Had all
grandchildren of Martha survived, the estate would have been distri-
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buted to them in equal shares, one-third going to each grandchild. The
great-grandchildren would thus be entitled to share in the one-third
share their respective parents would have taken had they survived.
Mildred would receive a full one-third share as the sole representative
of the share Martin would have taken; Jacob and Janice would share
equally the one-third share that would have been taken by their father,
Joseph. Judith would, of course, receive her own one-third per capita
share.
It is also possible to apply the Massachusetts definition to achieve
a strict per stirpes distribution of the estate among all eligible heirs.48
Judith would take one-fourth as representative of one-half the portion
her father, John, would have taken had he survived his mother;
Mildred would take a one-half share as sole representative of her
father, Martin, who would have taken as sole representative of his
mother, Mary, had he survived the decedent; and Jacob and Janice
would each take a one-eighth share as equal representatives of the
share that their father, Joseph, would have taken as representative of
one-half the share his father, John, would have taken had he survived
the decedent.
Conceptually, this method of applying the statute seems unnecessarily complicated. Additionally, it ignores the use of different
referents for determining eligibility to take and the share to be taken in
the statute defining right of representation. Faced with this language,
the Massachusetts court was correct in abandoning strict grammatical
analysis of the phrase "otherwise, they take by right of representation" in favor of an interpretation based on legislative policy and
consistency among various provisions of the statute.
Which Rule for Oklahoma?
The Oklahoma statutes on succesion were adopted from those in
force in California. 9 Interpretation of a California provision usually is
strong authority for interpretation of the parallel Oklahoma provision.
However, the California interpretation is not binding on Oklahoma
courts, particularly where the California decision interpreting the
statute followed rather than preceded the adoption of that statute by
Oklahoma.
Two circumstances make the Maud decision of less value in interpreting the parallel Oklahoma provision than might ordinarily be ex4" Almost any combination of statute and result is possible. See Atkinson, supra note 20,
at 41-49; Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 263 (deeds); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 191 (distribution among collaterals); Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 1023 (per stirpes and per capita distribution under wills.)
41

See Lowrey v. LeFlore, 48 Okla. 235, 149 P. 1112, 1113-14 (1915).
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pected. First, although Oklahoma's Title 84, Section 22850 was
adopted from the original version of California Probate Code Section
250, the latter was amended in 1931, fourteen years before the decision
in Maud.5 ' Thus, at the time Maud was decided, the crucial statute
defining "right of representation" in California was no longer identical to the statute defining that term in Oklahoma.52 Second, the
Oklahoma definition of "right of representation" found in section 228
is identical to the statutory definition of that phrase in Massachusetts
at the time Balch was decided. 3 Because the phrase used to indicate
the shares to be taken by descendants is identical in all three statutes,
the fact that Oklahoma's definition of "right of representation" is
identical to the Massachusetts definition, but different from the
California definition, suggests that the Massachusetts decision is the
more persuasive authority for interpretation of the Oklahoma statute.
Like the Massachusetts statute, Oklahoma's section 213 contains
numerous provisions under which distribution is to be made in equal
shares among takers of equal degree. 4 The only instances in which
shares are to be taken "by right of representation" involve situations
in which there are heirs of varying degrees of kinship designated to
take, as where there are "children and issue of deceased children" 55 or
"brothers and sisters and children of deceased brothers and sisters" 6
designated as heirs. In those instances, it is clear that those in the
generation nearest decedent take per capita, with representation being
applied only to those takers in the more remote degree of kinship to
decedent. Why, then, should the pattern be varied in the single instance in which the group of heirs of various degrees of kindred contain only grandchildren or more remote descendants?
The purpose of providing for distribution to descendants per
stirpes is either (1) to distribute an estate evenly among family lines
created by the decedent during his lifetime or (2) to reflect a legislatively presumed preference of the decedent that the decedent's closest

1084 OI.A.

STAT.

§ 228 (1971).
§ 250, Historical Note (West 1956).

" CAL. PROB. CODE

52 Compare the language of the California statute, quoted in text accompanying note 31,
supra, with that of 84 OKLA. STAT. § 228 (1971): "Inheritance or succession by right of representation takes place when the descendants of any deceased heir take the same share or right in the
estate of another person that their parents would have taken if living." (Emphasis added.)
5 Compare the language of the Massachusetts statute, quoted in text accompanying note
36, supra, with that of the Oklahoma statute, quoted in note 52, supra.
" 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth (1971).
" 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 First (1971).
" 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 Second, Third (1971).
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surviving relatives be the primary beneficiaries of his estate. 7 The
former purpose not only reflects an outdated view of family relationships but also conflicts with the specific provision of section 213 that
"if all descendants are in the same degree of kindred to the decedent
they share! equally." 58 Under this provision, if all designated heirs are
grandchildren, they take per capita. If it were intended that each
family line be treated equally, grandchildren always should be required
to take shares based on the portions their parents would have taken.
They should never receive shares based on the number of surviving
grandchildren.
Section 213 requires per capita distribution in every situation involving kindred of equal degree 9 The consistency of this approach
indicates a legislatively presumed preference of the decedent that his
closest surviving relatives be treated as the primary objects of his affection and benevolence. The interpretation of the language controlling distribution among heirs of varying degrees, which limits representation to those of more remote degree, harmonizes with this purpose
and with the language of section 228 defining right of representation.
As the Bakch court pointed out, this rule "maintains the principle of
equality among all descendants of the same degree, living and dead,
and gives to the more remote descendants exactly the same share which
their parent would be entitled to if living." 60
The uncertainty in the Oklahoma statute should be resolved. If
an appropriate case arises, the Oklahoma courts should resolve the
question in favor of limiting representation to descendants of the more
remote degree, rejecting the California rule on the basis of both policy
and the crucial variation in the language defining "right of representation." Alternatively, the legislature could resolve the question by
amending section 213, First to provide that "if all the descendants are
in the same degree of kindred to the decedent they share equally, but if
they are of unequal degree, those of more remote degree take by right
of representation. "6
11If the closest surviving kindred are considered the primary objects of decedent's
benevolence, they will take per capita (equal shares). Only more remote kindred will be limited
to representative shares.
,S84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 First (1971).

19See :34 OKLA. STAT. § 213 First ["the remainder in equal shares to his children..
and "if all the descendants are in the same degree of kindred to the decedent they share equally .. ."]; Second ["if he leave both father and mother, to them in equal shares.. ." and "in
equal shares to the brothers and sisters of the decedent.. ."]; and Third ["in equal shares to the
brothers and sisters

. .

." and "to the parents equally . .

149 Mass. 39, 43, 20 N.E. 322, 325 (1889).
The language suggested here is derived from UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-103(4).
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II. Will My Sister's Children Share?
Nieces and Nephews as Heirs of An Intestate
Nieces and nephews as heirs of a decedent are mentioned
specifically three times in section 213: Subsections Second and Third
refer to "children of any deceased brother or sister ' 6 2 and subsection
Fourth refers to "issue, if any, of deceased brothers and sisters." 63
Subsection Second controls when the decedent leaves a surviving
spouse but no surviving issue. In such a case, one-half the estate goes
to the surviving spouse and the other half to decedent's parents or the
survivor of them. If decedent left no surviving parent, then "said remaining one-half goes, in equal shares, to the brothers and sisters of
the decedent, and to the children of any deceased brother or sister, by
right of representation. '"" Subsection Third controls when decedent
leaves no surviving spouse and no issue or parent. In such a case, the
whole estate passes to brothers and sisters "and to the children of any
deceased brother or sister, by right of representation." 6 Subsection
Fourth purports to control when decedent leaves no surviving spouse,
issue, father, or sibling by providing that the whole estate pass to "his
mother to the exclusion of the issue, if any, of deceased brothers or
sisters."16 6 After subsection Second was amended to equalize the status
of father and mother in the scheme of preference in intestacy, subsection Fourth was held to be surplusage, having no further function
within the statute. 67 Before the amendment of subsection Second, the
mother of a decedent shared equally in the estate with brothers and
sisters of the decedent, participating only when decedent's father did
not survive him."
A question recently answered by the Oklahoma Supreme Court
was whether nieces and nephews share in a decedent's estate under
subsection Third or under subsection Sixth when decedent leaves no
surviving spouse and no issue, parent, or sibling surviving. In Brice v.
§ 213
§ 213
§ 213
§ 213
§ 213

Second, Third (1971).

6

84 OKrA.

STAT.

"
"

STAT.
STAT.

"

84 OKLA.
84 OmrA.
84 OrmA.
84 OKLA.

67

Squint Eye v. Crooked Arm, 56 Okla. 69, 74, 155 P. 1147, 1149 (1916).

"

STAT.
STAT.

Fourth (1971).
Second (1971).
Third (1971).
Fourth (1971).

11Prior to the 1909 amendment, subdivision Second read as follows: "If the decedent
leave no issue, the estate goes in equal shares to the surviving husband or wife, and to the dece-

dent's father. If there be no father, then one-half goes in equal shares to the brothers and sisterp
of the decedent, and to the children of any deceased brother or sister, by right of representation;

if he leave a mother also, she takes an equalshare with the brothers and sisters. If the decedent
leave no issue, nor husband nor wife, the estate must go to the father." WILSON's REVIsED AND
ANNOTATEr) STATUTES § 6895 (1903), quoted in Squint Eye v. Crooked Arm, 56 Okla. 69, 72,
155 P. 1147, 1148 (1916).
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Seebeck,"9 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that nieces and nephews
of a decedent take under subsection Sixth as "next of kin" rather than
under subsection Third as "children of deceased brothers and sisters"
when no brother or sister or nearer kindred survived decedent.70
Brice involved the estate of Ruth D. Pinkston, who died leaving
no surviving spouse, issue, parent, or sibling. The heirs were fourteen
nieces attd nephews of decedent, children of three predeceased
brothers and sisters 71:
Parents of Decedent(d)

Ethel(d)

I

RUTH D. PINKSTON(d)

I(decedent)
Leon Brice

I

Harry(d)

I
Seven Children

I
I

Dallas(d)

Six children

The trial court granted the request of the administratrix, Muriel E.
Seebeck (one of seven surviving children of decedent's brother,
Harry), to distribute the estate in equal shares to the surviving nieces
and nephews. Under this plan, each heir was to receive a onefourteenth share of the estate."
Leon Brice, the only surviving child of Ruth's deceased sister,
Ethel, appealed, arguing that distribution should be made under
subsection Third of section 213, which directs that distribution be
made "in equal shares to the brothers and sisters of the decedent, and
to the children of any deceased brotheror sister, by right of representation."7 Appellant's contention was that, under subsection Third,
the estate should be divided into three portions, each portion to then
be divided[ among the children of the deceased brother or sister who74
would have taken that share had he or she survived the decedent.
Under this method of distribution, appellant would receive one-third
of the estate as the sole representative of the share his mother, Ethel,
would have taken had she survived Ruth. The seven surviving children
of Harry and the six surviving children of Dallas would receive shares
based on the one-third shares their parents would have received if liv09

595 P.2d 441 (Okla.1979).

10Id. at 443.
71 Id. at 442.
71 Id.
7 .84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 Third (1971) (emphasis added).
74 595 P.2d 441, 442 (Okla. 1979).
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ing, Harry's children each taking a one-twenty-first share and Dallas's
children each taking a one-eighteenth share.
The issue as stated by the court was "whether the decedent's
estate passes by intestate succession on a per capita basis as opposed to
a per stirpes or by right of representation basis.""7 Although the effect
of the decision was to give nieces and nephews equal shares of the
estate, the basic question was not so much the method of apportionment as it was the basis of eligibility to participate in the estate at all.
The real issue in the case was whether nieces and nephews participate
in the estate of a decedent who left no nearer kindred because they are
"children of deceased brothers and sisters" or because they are "next
of kin." ' 76 The court decided that where decedent leaves no surviving
brother, sister, or closer kin, and no surviving spouse, nieces and
nephews take under subsection Sixth, which provides for inheritance
by the next of kin when "decedent leave[s] no issue, no husband, nor
wife, and no father or mother, or brother, or sister. . . . , Having
decided that the nieces and nephews derived their eligibility to take a
share of the estate from subsection Sixth,7 8 the court did not need to
explore further the question of how the share of each was to be determined. Subsection Sixth does not make provision for taking by
representation, providing only for participation limited to the next of
kin of the decedent in equal degree. 9
The approach taken in Brice was straightforward, the court relying upon the plain words of the statute in concluding that subsection
Third can only apply where there is a surviving brother or sister of the
decedent because subsection Sixth clearly states that it will apply when
no sibling or closer kin survives. The opinion deals only briefly with
prior Oklahoma decisions suggesting that subsection Third applies to
give nieces and nephews a right to participate in the distribution of an
intestate estate even where no brother or sister of the decedent survives. Referring to Lowrey v. LeFlore,8 0 in which it was held that a
nephew took to the exclusion of a grandniece by virtue of subsection
Third, the Brice opinion merely points out that "[tihe same result
75 Id.

71 If subdivision Third controls, the identifying language making nieces and nephews
eligible to participate is "children of deceased brother and sisters"; under subdivision Sixth,
nieces and nephews would take because they are "next of kin." 84 OKa. STAT. § 213 Third,
Sixth (1971).
7, 84 OKIA. STAT. § 213 Sixth (1971).
71 595 P.2d 441, 443 (Okla. 1979).
71 Id. See also Felgar's Estate, 272 P.2d 453 (Okla. 1954); Humphrey's Estate, 193 Okla.
151, 141 P.2d 993 (1943).
1048 Okla. 235, 149 P. 1112 (1915).
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could have been reached and possibly more appropriately under subdivision Sixth, since as the parties were kindred of unequal degree the
nephew would have been preferred."'" And, indeed, the court in
Lowrey did not expressly address the issue of which subsection aoplied. It simply quoted several portions of section 213 and stated:
"The third subdivision covers this case, and provides: 'If there be no
issue, husband, wife, father, nor mother, then ...
any deceased brother or sister.' ,182

to the children of

Assuming without discussion that subdivision Third was applicable, the court in Lowrey then proceeded to a discussion of the meaning of the word "children" in that subdivision, concluding that the
term was not equivalent to "issue" and that it did not include grandchildren of brothers and sisters." The same assumption appears in
three other cases that applied subsection Third to exclude grandnieces
and grandnephews from participation. 4 The discussion in each case
centered on the meaning of "children" under that subsection rather
than on the question of which subsection controlled.
Brice indirectly reaffirms earlier decisions8" construing subsections Second and Fifth of section 213 to exclude nieces and nephews
from participation in an intestate estate where decedent leaves a surviving spouse but no surviving sibling or nearer kin. The language of
subsection Second is parallel to that of subsection Third, giving onehalf to a surviving spouse and the other half to parents or the survivor
of them or, if no parent survived, to "brothers and sisters of the decedent, and to the children of any deceased brother or sister, by right of
representation." 86 The introductory language of subdivision Fifth is
identical to that of subdivision Sixth except that the former contemplates the existence of a surviving spouse while the latter does not.
The language referring to children of deceased brothers and sisters as
heirs under subdivision Second is identical to the language referring to
them as heirs under subdivision Third. Thus Brice reinforces earlier
decisions holding that nieces and nephews of a decedent may only take
under sub;ection Second where at least one brother or sister of the
decedent survives him.
11595

P.2d 441, 443 (Okla. 1979).
48 Okla. 235, 239, 149 P. 1112, 1113 (1915) (omission in original).
11Id. at 242, 149 P. at 1114.
14 Bruner's Estate, 125 Okla. 101, 256 P. 722 (1927); Burns v. Tiffee, 49 Okla. 262, 152
P. 368 (1915) (same estate as that involved in Lowrey v. LeFlore); Falter v. Walker, 47 Okla.
527, 149 P. 1111 (1914).
1, McMahon v. Foley, 188 Okla. 552, 111 P.2d 1076 (1940); Hughes v. Bell, 55 Okla.
555, 155 P. 6C4 (1916).
86 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 Second (1971).
82
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The effect on the nieces and nephews in this situation is far more
serious than in the case involving no surviving spouse. Where decedent
leaves no surviving spouse, the death of his last surviving sibling prior
to decedent's own death merely affects the portion of the estate that
will be distributed to the children of the other brothers and sisters of
the decedent. Suppose, however, the decedent leaves a surviving
spouse. By the death of the last surviving sibling of decedent, nieces
and nephews who would have participated in the estate had that sibling survived are suddenly relegated to the position of having no interest whatsoever in the decedent's estate. For example, suppose the
following family exists before Dorothy's death:

I

Parents (d)

I
Harry-m.--DOROTHY

(no issue)

Nan

I

I

Sarah(d)

Sandra (d)

Nat

a

I
Benjamin

Norman

Nettie

If Dorothy is the first to die of those shown as living on the chart, her
estate will be distributed under subsection Second because she will
leave no issue or parent but will leave a surviving spouse (Harry) and a
surviving brother (Benjamin). Harry will receive one-half the estate as
surviving spouse. The other half will be divided into three portions,
based on the number of brothers and sisters surviving or represented.
One portion (one-sixth of the estate) will go to Benjamin in his own
right; one portion will go to Nona as sole representative of her mother,
Sandra; and one portion will be divided equally between Nan and Nat
as representatives of the mother, Sarah (each receiving one-twelfth of
the estate). 7
Suppose, however, that Benjamin dies before Dorothy does.
Then her whole estate will go to Harry as surviving spouse under
subsection Fifth. There will be no participation in the estate by any
child of Dorothy's brothers and sisters.88
This result may be exactly what was intended, and it is inevitable
under the present wording of the statute. It may be that there was a
deliberate legislative assumption that a decedent would include nieces
and nephews in the distribution of his wealth if he left both a surviving
17 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 Second, 228 (1971).
"

84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 Fifth (1971) and cases cited in note 85, supra.
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spouse and a surviving brother or sister but would exclude them if he
left only a surviving spouse. This seems unlikely, however. The history
of the Ca1ifornia legislation, from which the Oklahoma statute was
derived, is enlightening on the question of probable legislative intent.
In 1889 the introductory language of the California provision
paralleling Oklahoma's subsection Fifth read: "If the decedent leave a
surviving husband or wife, and neither issue, father, mother, brother,
nor sister, the whole estate goes to the surviving husband or wife."'"
The Supreme Court of California was presented with the question of
whether this section operated to exclude nieces and nephews from participation as "children of deceased brothers and sisters" under a section parallel to Oklahoma's subsection Second. 90 In Ingram'sEstate v.
Glough,91 the court decided that the quoted section controlled, excluding nieces and nephews from participation where no sibling or
closer relative of the decedent survived him. In the course of this opinion, the California court stated:
It is vain to argue against the injustice of the rule, or to contend that in
a case like the one at bar the children of a deceased sister ought to have
a share in the estate when there is not any surviving brother or sister, as
well as when there is. Succession to estates is purely a matter of
statutory regulation, which cannot be changed by courts. 92
93
In 1905 the California statute on intestate succession was amended.
The language of the subdivision that, according to the Ingram court,
controlled the situation where decedent left a surviving spouse but no
issue, parent, or sibling, was amended to include in "the classes, the
existence of which would forbid the surviving spouse from taking all
of the estate 'the children or grandchildren of a deceased brother or
sister.'

"9"

Although two California cases decided after this amendment
followed the Ingram decision, 9 in the 1917 case of Jepson's Estate96
the Supreme Court of California held that the 1905 amendment had so
changed the statute that nieces and nephews were no longer excluded
from participation in a decedent's estate merely because no brother or
"

CAL. PROB. CODE § 220, Historical Note, p. 438 (West 1956).

90Id.
9- 78 Cal. 586, 21 P. 435 (1889).
92 Id., 21 P. at 435.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 220, Historical Note p. 439 (West 1956).
9, Jepson's Estate, 174 Cal. 684, 686-87, 164 P. 1, 2 (1917).
91 Nigro's Estate, 149 Cal. 702, 87 P. 384 (1906); Carmody's Estate, 88 Cal. 616, 26 P.
373 (1891).
96 174 Cal. 684, 164 P.1 (1917).
"

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol34/iss2/4

1981]

DISTRIBUTION OF DECEDENTS"ESTA TES

287

sister of decedent had survived. In reaching this conclusion the court
pointed out that, under the prior language, the Ingram decision had
been
forced [on the court] in the sense that it was an inevitable and
unescapable conclusion. The unreasonableness of it-even the injustice
of it-was apparent and was recognized. No sound reason could be or
ever was attempted to be abduced to support a law which said, as then
did ours, that children of a deceased brother or sister could share in the
estate if there was another living brother or sister, but could not share if
there were none.9
The Oklahoma court, like the Ingram court, has been compelled
by the words of the statute to hold that nieces and nephews are excluded entirely from participation in a decedent's estate unless at least one
sibling of the decedent also survives. This result is indeed peculiar.
This is the only situation created by section 213 in which a potential
heir is removed from the class of persons eligible to participate in an
intestate estate by the death of someone in a generation closer to the
decedent. The normal pattern is that persons enter the class of persons
who will receive some portion of the estate because some person more
closely related to decedent predeceases him. For example, grandchildren only become eligible to participate in the estate of their grandparent by the prior death of their parent. 98 Great-grandchildren only
become eligible to participate in the estate of their great-grandparent
upon the prior deaths of both their parent and grandparent. 9 9 Parents
of a decedent only become eligible to participate in the estate when
decedent either dies childless or is predeceased by his children., 0
Brothers and sisters of a decedent only participate in the estate if decedent's descendants (if any) and parents all predecease decedent. 0 1
Only in the application of subsections Second and Fifth is it possible
for one to enter the class of potential heirs through the death of one
person (one's parent, a brother or sister of decedent) and later to be
removed from that class through the death of another person (one's
next-to-last surviving aunt or uncle).10 2
According to Brice, the language used in subdivisions Second and
Third "reflects a legislative effort to treat the shares of predeceased
Id. at 687, 164 P. at 2.
I,
1184 OKLA. STAT. § 213 First (1971).
"I
9d.

10o84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 Second (1971).
10184 OKLA. STAT. § 213 Second, Third (1971).
10284 OKLA. STAT. § 213 Second, Fifth (1971).
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brothers and sisters of decedent who are survived by children, equally
with those of brothers and sisters who have survived the decedent by
permitting the children of such pre-deceased brothers and sisters of
decedent to stand in the pre-deceased brothers' and sisters' position by
right of representation."' 1 3 Although this statement explains the
method provided by the legislature for determining the shares to be
taken by brothers and sisters and children of deceased brothers and
sisters when representatives of each group survive, it does not sufficiently explain why, under subdivision Second, children of deceased
brothers and sisters are included as heirs at all. If there is a legislative
determination reflected in subsection Fifth that the decedent would
have preferred that the estate go to the surviving spouse to the exclusion of nieces and nephews, why is that determination not reflected in
subsection Second? The policy reflected in subsection Second would
be consistent with that supporting subsection Fifth only if, under
subsection Second, the shares which now go to nieces and nephews
were to pass instead to the surviving spouse or to surviving siblings.
This could. have been accomplished by simply omitting the phrase
"and to the children of any deceased brother or sister, by right of
representation" from subsection Second, so that one-half would pass
to the surviving spouse and one-half to surviving siblings of decedent
in equal shares. Alternatively, the statute could have provided that the
one-half currently designated for siblings and their children should be
divided into as many shares as decedent had brothers and sisters, living
or dead, each surviving brother or sister to take one share and the remaining shares to pass to the surviving spouse.
It is unlikely that the legislature intended that the eligibility of a
niece or nephew of a decedent to participate in the decedent's estate
should be controlled by the death or survival of someone not a direct
ancestor of' that niece or nephew. There is a clear inconsistency between the apparent policy of subsection Fifth, which gives preference
to a surviving spouse to the exclusion of nieces and nephews, and that
of subsection Second, which allows both a surviving spouse and nieces
and nephews to share in the estate when at least one sibling of the
decedent survives him.
This inconsistency is one that must be resolved by the legislature.
The courts cannot change the wording of section 213, which is, at least
after Brice, quite clear. The statute should be amended to reflect the
view that nieces and nephews are to be considered primary objects of a
decedent's affection and benevolence where no sibling or closer kinIDS595 P.2d 441, 442-43 (Okla. 1979).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol34/iss2/4

19811

DISTRIBUTION OF DECEDENTS' ESTA TES

289

dred survives him without regard to whether decedent left a surviving
spouse.
This change could be accomplished quite easily by amending subsections Fifth and Sixth to include "children of deceased brothers and
sisters" among the class of persons whose failure to survive triggers
operation of the section. The introduction to subsection Fifth would
then read: "If the decedent leave a surviving husband or wife, and no
issue, and no father, nor mother, nor brother, nor sister, nor any child
of any deceased brother or sister, . . ." The language of subsection
Sixth would parallel the language of subsection Fifth, the only difference in the introductory language being the inclusion of "nor husband, nor wife" in the list of persons whose failure to survive leads to
the application of the subsection.
At the same time, subsections Second and Third should be
amended to provide that, where there is no surviving brother or sister
or nearer relative of decedent, the share designated for children of
deceased brothers and sisters should be divided among them per capita
and not by right of representation. Without such amendment, the
changes in subsections Fifth and Sixth will force the court to hold that
nieces and nephews always take under subsection Second or subsection
Third as "children of deceased brothers and sisters, by right of
representation. ' 104 Under the current language of those subsections,
nieces and nephews would always take a share based on the share their
parent would have taken, and could never take on a per capita basis. It
would be extremely difficult for a court to construe the present
language to reach any other result. Yet to force apportionment by
representation upon the nieces and nephews of a decedent even where
no sibling of decedent survived would be contrary to the policy of
10
treating heirs of equal degree of kinship to decedent equally. 5
Language similar to that suggested for subsection First, dealing
with descendants of a decedent,10 6 could be used to clarify subsections
Second and Third. The statute would then read: "then said remaining
one-half goes to the brothers and sisters of the decedent, and to the
children of any deceased brother or sister, provided that if all those
participating in this share are in the same degree of kindred to the
decedent they-share equally, but if they are of unequal degree, those of
more remote degree take by right of representation."

114 84 OKLA. STAT.
'o5

§ 213 Second, Third (1971).
See text accompanying notes 57 to 59, supra.

,o6
See text accompanying note 61, supra.
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Conclusion
The two problems of distribution of intestate estates discussed
above both require resolution. The question of distribution among
grandchildren and more remote descendants of a decedent could be
resolved by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma if an appropriate case
were presented to it. If such a case arises, the court should adopt the
construction that limits representative taking to decendants of the
more remote generation, allowing the descendants of the generation
closest to decedent to share per capita.
Alternatively, the question of distribution among descendants
could be resolved quite easily by the legislature. Resolution of the inconsistent treatment of nieces and nephews under the current statute
can only come from the legislature. The legislature should resolve both
problems at the same time through an amendment of section 213 incorporating the recommended changes.
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